Dariusz Karłowicz, The Archparadox of Death: Martyrdom as a Philosophical Category

A book by Dariusz Karłowicz, The Archparadox of Death: Martyrdom as a Philosophical Category, has appeared in the series European Studies in Theology, Philosophy and History of Religions. In the Introduction, the author writes that, beginning in the second century, Christians who gave their lives for Christ were called “witnesses” (martys). Yet, according to Karłowicz, this theological category of “witness” has philosophical presuppositions, although it cannot be reduced to the tradition of philosophical categories (p. 13). The purpose of the book is to explore the theme of martyrdom within the sphere of the classical categories of ancient philosophy, while popular psychological and sociological categories (such as Émile Durkheim’s “altruistic suicide”) are deliberately left outside the scope of the study.

The first part of the book is entitled “Philosophy Dethroned” (pp. 17–83). It is devoted to examining the Christian attitude toward philosophy and the Christian understanding of philosophy. According to the author, the first expression of the Christian attitude toward philosophy and pagan culture was the speech of the Apostle Paul at the Areopagus in Athens (Acts 17). Analyzing this speech, the author concludes that, for the Apostle Paul, philosophy does not lead to God but only brings one toward Him; Christianity alone is the treasury of truth, while philosophy must be completed by Christian teaching, since without divine assistance it remains incomplete (pp. 25–26). The author then analyzes those passages from the Apostle Paul’s epistles that concern the connection or distinction between philosophy and Christianity (pp. 32–59).

The author’s conclusion is that Christianity is paradoxical: to philosophy it appears as foolishness, as the “folly of the Cross” (1 Cor 1:22). Everything in Christianity is paradoxical—the Resurrection, the sacraments, holiness—because the Kingdom of God is not of this world. As the author concludes: “To affirm the paradoxical character of Christianity is to affirm the radical, irreconcilable conflict between the wisdom of God and human wisdom” (p. 59).

At the same time, it is precisely at this point—the point of paradox—that Christianity comes very close to ancient philosophy, because “paradox is the language of philosophical truth” (p. 60), and ancient philosophy itself “has a paradoxical character” (ibid.). Philosophy was understood by the ancient person not as a collection of views but as “a path of reeducation of the human person, a path leading to perfection” (p. 61), as a “technique of the inner life, of life according to reason” (p. 62), as “radical change” (ibid.), “spiritual experience” (p. 73), and “spiritual guidance” (p. 78).

For this reason, many Christian authors (Aristides, Justin Martyr, Tatian, Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Melito of Sardis) regarded Christianity as a kind of philosophy, or, more precisely, as the completely true and unique form of philosophy (p. 79). This idea can subsequently be traced through the Alexandrian theological school, medieval monasticism, and finally among Renaissance humanists (p. 80). If philosophy is understood as an instrument that helps the human person advance toward perfection, then Revelation is the perfect instrument, the summit of philosophy, “the fullness of truth, the definitive and complete expression of reality” (p. 80). Moreover, as the author concludes: “Christianity is not only the best philosophy, but the only philosophy outside of which the human person cannot attain perfection” (p. 81).

The second part of the book, “Testimony as Proof” (pp. 85–138), is devoted to the category of testimony in Christian and pagan writings. The author begins by analyzing the concept of martyrdom itself, which took shape within Christianity in the second half of the second century. Originally, the term martys referred exclusively to living witnesses. Thus Christ is the true Witness to God (Rev 1:5; 3:14), who came into the world to bear witness to the truth (Jn 18:37) and to testify to what He had seen and heard from the Father (Jn 3:11; 3:22), while the apostles are the true witnesses to Christ.

From the middle of the second century, however, this term began to be applied to Christians who, although they had not been historical witnesses to the life and Resurrection of Christ, died as victims of cruel persecution (for example, Antipas [Rev 2:13] and Stephen [Acts 22:20]). Moreover, as the author notes, “before the year 150, death for the faith was not defined by the concept martyrein. After that date this concept becomes universal and acquires a clearly defined form” (p. 88).

The author then considers two kinds of sources for the Christian concept of martyrdom. The first is the Jewish tradition, vividly expressed in the Books of Maccabees. “Jewish theology of martyrdom is above all apocalyptic.... The spiritual meaning of persecutions is the purification of Israel from sins, as well as the judgment of the fidelity of the righteous. The persecutors are weapons not only against human beings, but also against the Creator” (p. 92). For the ancient Church, the example of the deaths of the Maccabees and the heroes of the Book of Daniel was of enormous importance. Many Christian authors saw the Maccabean brothers as Jewish martyrs (p. 93).

The second tradition is philosophical. One of the principal sources for the Christian tradition was Epictetus’ Discourses: testimony by deed must complement testimony by word (p. 95). Other sources of the philosophical tradition were Seneca, Cicero (p. 96), and Plato (pp. 101–118). It is precisely through the philosophical tradition, according to the author, that one of the earliest themes of Christian literature becomes the harmony between teaching and life (p. 129), the “harmony between word and deed” (p. 131). And if Christians are called to preach the Gospel to the whole world, then martyrdom is preaching through deeds (p. 135).

Thus, as the author himself concludes, martyrdom has a philosophical foundation. If, for ancient philosophers, the goal of philosophy is the perfection of the human person, then in Christianity the martyr becomes the person who has attained perfection. Consequently, we arrive at two complementary definitions of philosophy. The first belongs to Tertullian (Apology): philosophy as preparation for death. The second belongs to Plato: philosophy as divinization (p. 137). The third and fourth parts of the book are devoted precisely to these two definitions.

The third part, “Perfection and Death” (pp. 139–184), considers the connection of perfection with suffering and death. The persecutions of Christians in the first centuries further emphasized the importance of this connection (pp. 139–140). At the same time, the idea itself was not new. We encounter it in Aeschylus and Sophocles, in the person of Socrates, and among the Stoics (p. 142). The philosopher is condemned not for his deeds but because he is a philosopher, since “the world and wisdom are two warring adversaries” (p. 143).

In the dialogue Phaedo, Plato, through the words of Socrates, proclaims philosophy as preparation for death (p. 152), as the spiritual liberation of the soul from the body, as freedom from temptations and sufferings. This interpretation of philosophy as an experience of dying would subsequently be adopted by the Pythagorean-Stoic tradition and then by Christianity.

As the author writes, the definition of philosophy as preparation for death is deeply apophatic and paradoxical: “The state of perfection is revealed through the negation of imperfections, that is, of what ordinarily impedes happiness and perfection. Perfection is the negation of life, and the path to wisdom is learning to die. Such a definition of philosophy was, is, and will remain the archparadox” (p. 153).

The archparadox of life and death, according to the author, constitutes one of the central elements of the Christian interpretation of the drama of Adam and Eve’s disobedience. Death is the consequence of sin, but this is not physical death (which is secondary), but death as “bondage to sin” (p. 155). After Christ’s redemptive death, physical death is no longer frightening for the believer. “The whole Christian life is an exercise in spiritual readiness for death” (p. 158).

Already Clement of Alexandria, in the fourth book of the Stromata, writes that the entire education of the Christian is nothing other than preparation for death, while the perfect training of the soul is death for Christ (p. 158). Origen, echoing Plato’s Phaedo, writes the Exhortation to Martyrdom, in which he observes that preparation for death is testimony to Christian maturity and an expression of progress in wisdom. It is precisely in the face of death that a person discovers what seed he has sown and upon what foundation his house has been built (p. 159). The Alexandrian theological school, as the author shows, was very close on this question to the Platonic tradition (p. 160).

Other followers of Plato were also the Gnostics (for example, Marcion), who identified the body with a “great evil” (p. 163). In response to such claims, Christians declared that they fled from the evil of this world, not from the world as such; and the struggle for eternal life is also a struggle for the body, to free it from the slavery of sin. “Preparation for death is not simply the negation of the body. It is something more. It is preparation for its resurrection” (p. 165).

The author then considers the problem of suicide, which in classical antiquity was an acceptable and justified phenomenon (ibid.). The choice of death as the philosophical act par excellence is found among the Cynics and especially among the Stoics. Christians, for their part, regarded martyrdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit and for this reason believed that no one should risk his life without divine assistance (p. 173).

Plato’s Phaedo, as an exhortation to the practice of philosophy, not only gives a definition of wisdom but also presents an example of its application—the example of Socrates practicing in death (p. 174). If Socrates becomes, in the eyes of the ancient world, an example of spiritual perfection, a kind of hero, Christianity surpasses this heroism by making it the lot of every believer.

As the author writes: “If the Stoics said that a real martyr was as rare as the Phoenix, ordinary Christians went to their deaths in enormous numbers. What among the pagans was the achievement of an elite acquired universal significance among Christians” (p. 177). In this too one may see the superiority of Christianity over philosophy.

As the author summarizes: “From the very beginning Christianity sees martyrdom as a moral miracle possessing a persuasive argument that affirms the divine origin of the Christian religion and its authenticity. The perfection which, according to many philosophers, was considered unattainable in this life becomes the possession of the martyrs thanks to divine assistance. The state of the martyrs expresses the natural and at the same time transcendental perfection of the sage who, using the categories of the Apostle Paul, demonstrates spirit and power. Martyrdom is the miracle of total conversion, the realization of the goal. Perfection is revealed in the martyrs” (p. 184).

But the categories of the Phaedo allow us to understand the negative qualities of perfection, expressed in complete independence from the world. The positive definition of testimony is that martyrdom proceeds from a divine source. Christian authors often testify that Christ is present in the martyr and gives him the strength to endure sufferings for His sake.

Therefore martyrdom itself is proof of the divinity of Christian teaching, which in turn brings us to another Platonic definition: philosophy as that which leads us to divinization. The final chapter, “Martyrdom as Perfect Transformation” (pp. 185–240), is devoted to this subject.

In this chapter the author analyzes the positions of ancient Greek and Roman philosophers concerning the impossibility of attaining final perfection and perfect wisdom in this life, something accessible only to the gods. Christian authors agree with the pagan sages in this respect, since they too affirm that final blessedness is separated from our life by death and Judgment: “Only when we stand before God, face to face, will our destiny be decided” (p. 206).

Despite this apparent similarity, the author notes the uniqueness of the Christian doctrine of divinization, which consists in the “total transformation of the human body” (p. 207). According to the Apostle Paul, in his earthly condition the human person cannot attain the Kingdom of Heaven. The corruptible and sinful body must be transformed into a glorified body (Phil 3:21), spiritual and incorruptible (1 Cor 15:42–44), and immortal (1 Cor 15:53). This transformation will occur only at the end of time (1 Cor 15:52).

Divinization is not liberation from the snares of matter, but the spiritualization of the body, which, like the soul, contains within itself an element of perfection and likeness to God (p. 208). If the philosophical ideal of perfection (for example, among the Stoics) was reduced merely to freedom from suffering (apatheia), Christians understand this ideal more broadly and optimistically: it is the resurrection of the whole human person, consisting of an immortal soul and a glorified body. For Christians, martyrdom is an anticipation of this perfection, since death for Christ is “an act of the highest love and the most complete response to the divine call” (p. 214).

In the Conclusion to the book (pp. 241–252), the author presents the principal conclusions of the work, which amount to the idea that, although philosophy was in many respects a prerequisite for the emergence of the idea of “witness”-martyrdom, Christianity greatly enriched and transformed this concept. And if Revelation is a paradox for philosophy, then death and martyrdom become the archparadox.

The book also includes an index (pp. 253–259) and bibliography (pp. 261–274).

The book will be of interest to philosophers, theologians, historians, as well as to all those interested in the history of thought and the relationship between philosophy and theology.